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Secure property rights are considered a key determinant 
of economic development. However, evaluation of the 
causal effects of land titling is a difficult task. Since 2004, 
the Brazilian government, through a program called 
“Papel Passado,” has issued titles to more than 85,000 
families and has the goal to reach 750,000. Another topic 
in public policy that is crucial for developing economies 
is child labor force participation. In Brazil, about 5.4 
million children and teenagers between 5 and 17 years 
old are working full time. This paper examines the 
direct impact of securing a property title on child labor 
force participation. In order to isolate the causal role of 
ownership security, this study uses a comparison between 
two close and similar communities in the City of Osasco 
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case (a town with 650,000 people in the São Paulo 
metropolitan area). The key point of this case is that 
some units participate in the program and others do not. 
One of them, Jardim Canaã, received land titles in 2007; 
the other, Jardim DR, given fiscal constraints, will not 
be part of the program until 2012, and for that reason 
became the control group. Estimates, generated using the 
difference-in-difference econometric technique suggest 
that titling results in a substantial decrease in child labor 
force participation for the families that received the title 
compared with the others. These findings are relevant for 
future policy tools for dealing with informality and how 
it affects economic growth.How Land Title Affects Child Labor ? 
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The role played by private rights in the economic development of the Western world has 
been powerfully documented by economic historians such as North & Thomas (1973). The 
fragility of property rights is considered a crucial obstacle for economic development 
(NORTH, 1990). The main argument is that individuals underinvest if others can seize the 
fruits of their investment (DEMSETZ, 1967). Torstensson (1994) and Goldsmith (1995) 
found a significantly positive association between secure property rights and economic 
growth. 
In such context, strengthening economic institutions is widely argued to foster 
investment in physical and human capital, bolster growth performance, reduce 
macroeconomic volatility and encourage an equitable and efficient distribution of economic 
opportunity (ACEMOGLU et al., 2002). In the current developing world scenario, a pervasive 
sign of feeble property rights is the 930 million people living in urban dwellings without 
possessing formal titles to the plots of land they occupy (United Nations, Habitat Report, 
2005). The lack of formal property rights constitutes a severe limitation for the poor. The 
absence of formal titles creates constraints on using land as collateral to access credit markets 
(BESLEY, 1995). 
De Soto (2000) emphasizes that the lack of property rights limits the transformation of 
the wealth owned by the poor into capital. Proper titling could allow the poor to collateralize 
the land. Field & Torero (2002) mentioned that this credit could be invested as capital in 
productive projects, promptly increasing labor productivity and income. Among policy-
makers as well, property titling is increasingly considered one of the most effective forms for 
targeting the poor and encouraging economic growth (BAHAROGLU, 2002; BINSWANGER 
et al., 1995) as translated in the Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Land registration 
 
Source: World Bank, 2008 
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The most famous example is Peru in Latin America. The Peruvian government issued 
property titles to 1.2 million urban households during the 1990s. In Asia, millions of titles are 
being issued in Vietnam and Cambodia as shown in the The Economist magazine in the 
March 15, 2007 edition. The same edition states on the front page: "Property Rights: China's 
Next Revolution". The survey shows that China intends to put into place the most ambitious 
land-titling program in the world's history and includes this initiative as one of the main 
points of the Chinese economic development model. 
In Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced during his first week in office, 
back in 2003, a massive plan to title 750,000 families all over the country. The Brazilian 
federal government created a program called "Papel Passado". Since launched, the program 
has spent US$ 15 million per year from the federal budget, providing titles to over 85,000 and 
reaching 49 cities in 17 different Brazilian states. The official goal of the program is "to 
develop land titles in Brazil and promote an increase in the quality of life for the Brazilian 
population". However, the country still faces a very difficult scenario regarding land property 
rights: the Brazilian government estimates that 12 million people live under illegal urban 
conditions (IBGE, 2007). 
Furthermore, child labor is a major issue faced by the global economy. In Brazil, about 
5.4 million children and teenagers between 5 and 17 years old are working (PNAD, IBGE, 
2007). 
This paper investigates the impact of property rights on labor markets in an emerging 
economy such as Brazil by analyzing household response regarding to child labor force 
participation to an exogenous change in formal ownership status. In particular, the paper 
assesses the value to a squatter household of increases in tenure security associated with 
obtaining a property title in terms of hours of child labor supply. 
Effects of land titling have been documented by several studies. A partial listing 
includes Jimenez (1985), Alston et al. (1996) and Lanjouw & Levy (2002) on real estate 
values. Besley (1995), Jacoby et al. (2002), Brasselle et al. (2002) and Do & Iyer (2003) on 
agricultural investment. Place & Migot-Adholla (1998), Carter & Olinto (2002) and Field & 
Torero (2002) on credit access, housing investment and income. 
In urban settings, the value of property titles has been measured far less often and 
empirical work has focused on real estate prices. A major contribution is from the of paper by 
Jimenez (1984), involving an equilibrium model of urban squatting in which it is shown that 
the difference in unit housing prices between the non-squatting (formal) sector of a city and 
its squatting (informal) sector reflects the premium associated with security. The 
accompanying empirical analysis of real estate markets in the Philippines finds equilibrium 
price differentials between formal and informal sector unit dwelling prices in the range of 
58.0% and greater for lower-income groups and larger households. 
For Besley (1995), the findings were ambiguous; land rights appear to have a positive 
effect on agricultural investment in the Ghananian region of Angola but less noticeable impact 
on the region of Wassa. Using a similar approach, Jacoby et al. (2002) find positive effects in 
China, whereas Brasselle et al.  (2002) find no effects for Burkina Faso. Field & Torero 
(2002), in Peru, exploit timing variability in the regional implementation of the Peruvian 
titling program using cross-sectional data on past and future title recipients midway through 
the project, and also find positive effects, particularly in credit access and housing 
investments. In Brazil, Andrade (2006) using cross-section data from a sample of 200 families 
of the Comunidade do Caju, an urban poor community in Rio de Janeiro, has demonstrated an 
increase effect on the income of those that had received the land title. 
A common obstacle, faced by all studies mentioned above, is how to measure the 
influence of tenure security considering the potential endogeneity of ownership rights as 
pointed by Demsetz (1967) and Alchian & Demsetz (1973). Direct evidence of this is 4 
 
provided by Miceli et al. (2001), who analyze the extent of endogeneity of formal agricultural 
property rights in Kenya. 
In order to isolate the causal role of ownership security, this study uses a natural 
experiment, basically a comparison between two neighboring and very similar communities in 
the City of Osasco (a town with 650,000 people located in the São Paulo - Brazil metropolitan 
area). Osasco is part of the Papel Passado's map and has 6,000 families living informally on 
urban property. One of them, Jardim Canaã, was fortunate to receive titles in 2007; the other, 
Jardim DR, will be part of the program schedule in 2012, and for that reason became the 
control group. This enables a comparison of households in a neighborhood reached by the 
program with households in a neighborhood not yet reached. 
Furthermore, the present research, different from the previous studies, is based on panel 
data, based on a random sample from Jardim Canaã and Jardim DR, and produced from a 
two-stage survey with focus on the property rights issue. The first part of the survey was 
collected in March 2007, before titles had been issued to Jardim Canaã, and the second 
collected in August 2008, almost one year and half after the titles. As Ravallion et. al (2005) 
argue, the best ex-post evaluations are designed and implemented ex-ante -- often side-by-side 
with the program itself. 
And, based on the first survey, 95.0% of the survey participants (from Canaã and DR) 
were not aware about receiving land titles and the meaning of it (which avoids any behavior 
deviation generated by the expectation of having a land title). From the second stage of the 
survey, most of households that received the land title felt that it improved their lives– (see 




Figure 2: How land title affected household's life? 
 
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008 
 
Hence, an important contribution of this paper is the specific focus on non-agricultural 
households and the value to urban residents and their families of increased ownership 
security. As shown, in developing economies, large proportions of urban and rural residents 
alike lack tenure security. As Field & Torero (2002) demonstrated, presumably because of 
historic interests in agricultural investment and related politics of land reform, the majority of 
both academic and policy attention to property rights has centered on rural households’ tenure 
security. Nevertheless, in most of the developing world, the population -  particularly the 
impoverished population - is increasingly urban. 5 
 
Secondly, this research provides unique panel data through a natural experiment that 
helps to minimize the endogeneity aspect related to most of the studies on such subject 
(property rights). 
Third, many aspects have been applied to try to explain the reasons for child labor. The 
most common are income, poverty, parents’ level of education, parents’ previous child labor 
experience, credit constraints, and others. This paper intends to provide an additional aspect 
that can be used as part of the explanation for the causes of child labor. 
Last, but not least, this paper provides an initial impact measure, in terms of applied 
public policy, for the "Papel Passado" program and gives a partial feedback for policy-
makers about the effects of land titling in variation of child labor force participation. 
Certainly, reducing child labor force participation is one of the main goals of federal and local 
governments. Social programs such as PETI (Programa de Erradicação de Trabalho 
Infantil), an initiative that focuses on providing education opportunities for children engaged 
in labor activities and extra income for their poor families, is a great example of government's 
concern. Understanding the potential positive effects of land titling and property rights in such 
subject could be valuable to make any effort related to child labor participation stronger and 
more effective. 
 
1.  Child Labor Force Participation: The Economic Context 
 
Investing in and focusing on human capital development is a critical factor to increase 
economic growth, as stated by Becker and Lewis (1973), and given such a key assumption, 
The United Nations Millennium  Development  Goals include eliminating child labor as a 
crucial step into a better and equal world. 
According to the International Labour Organization (2002), 246 million children and 
teenagers between 5 and 17 years old are engaged in child labor around the world. 
Furthermore, 75.0% of those children work for their own family activities. Asia, Africa and 
Latin America are the continents with the most the child labor in the world. Asia has the 
highest number of children in terms of volume but Africa is the leader relative to the total size 
of the work force. 
In Brazil, data from PNAD (IBGE, 2007) has shown that from a 44.7 million population 
between 5 and 17 years old, 10.8% (4.8 million) are directly involved in child labor. The 
worst region of Brazil regarding this subject is the Northeast, with 13.4% of the 5-17 year old 
population working; Southeast holds the lowest average (7.9%). These statistics represent a 
positive evolution over the last 4 years (see Figure 3 below). 
 
   6 
 
Figure 3: Occupation level among the 5-17 year-old population (Percentual of 
total 5-17 population) 
 
Source: IBGE, PNAD 2007 
 
 
However, child labor is still a major issue for Brazilian policy makers and PNAD 
(IBGE, 2007) also indicates that. For example, 60.0% of the children between 5 and 13 years 
old are involved in non-paid activities. In the rural areas of Brazil, 40.0% of the 5-17 year old 
population works between 30 and 40 hours per week. In the Southeast, the richest region in 
the country, 30.0% work at least 40 hours per week. 
Economic science has developed a range of potential theories to explain child labor. As 
Becker and Lewis (1973) state, child labor is an activity that generates current benefits in 
terms of income, but also creates future costs by reducing study and leisure. Given that, 
families evaluate  the  cost-benefits related to sending  their children to school or to work. 
Rosenzweig (1981) has demonstrated that children's time allocation depends on the 
production capacity of the children and their parents and the substitution degree of the work 
force between both. 
Basu & Van (1998) have  built a model using one basic assumption: luxury. They 
consider that poverty is the main factor that makes parents send children to work. Hence, the 
children's time that is not allocated (school and leisure) to generate income is luxury, which 
low-income parents cannot afford. Ray (2001) has created a theory for emerging economies: 
child labor occurs mainly because of poverty and credit market imperfections. He has shown 
that if poor families had access to credit, in the presence of high returns for education, they 
would be willing to send their children to school instead of work. Furthermore, the same study 
showed the relationship between income inequality and child labor under credit constraints. 
The main conclusion states that a more equal income distribution would reduce child labor. 
Kassouf (2002) demonstrates that an increase in the household's income reduces the 
probability of child labor and increases school attendance. Another element that affects the 
probability of child labor is the parent's education degree. Bhalotra & Heady (2003) find a 
negative effect given the mother's level of education and the child’s labor participation in 
Ghana. The effect of the mother's education profile is higher compared with the father’s. 
Kassouf (2002), in Brazil, obtains the same negative effect. Family composition is another 
relevant factor.  Patrinos & Psacharapoulos (1994),  for Paraguay,  and Bhalotra & Heady 
(2003), for Pakistan, conclude that the more people there are in the family, the greater the 
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Wahba (2002), using data from Egypt, shows a phenomenon called "dynastic poverty 
traps," which means that the probability of children being sent to work increases 10% when 
their parents had worked during their childhood. Emerson & Souza (2003) reach the same 
conclusion and explain such event as "social norms", parents that worked during their 
childhood years face child labor more naturally. As mentioned earlier, this paper aims to 
provide an additional element for that discussion and test the relation between land titling and 
child labor force participation using the case of the City of Osasco. 
 
 
2.  Microeconomic Framework – The Basics 
 
Cockburn (1998) points out that one of the principal gains of strong property institutions 
is to shift the burden of property protection and enforcement away from individual households 
and informal communities to the state. 
There is little microeconomic evidence documenting the cost of informality to 
individual households. Carter & Zegarra (2000), World Bank (2000) and Field (2007) note 
that, in many settings, informal institutions arise to compensate for the absence of formal 
property protection. In such context, there is one important mechanism by which it is assumed 
that tenure security removes individuals from the labor force and incremental income. 
Untitled households are constrained by the need to provide informal policing, both to deter 
prospective invaders from invading private properties and to actively participate in 
community enforcement efforts to protect neighborhood boundaries. 
Hence, an important outcome of titling efforts that effectively increase household tenure 
security should allow households and communities to reallocate time, resources and human 
talent away from this role. 
The acquisition of a property title has a direct value in terms of freeing up hours of work 
(and income generation) previously devoted to maintaining tenure security through informal 
means. 
I (Income) = f(w;H
m) 
w = market wage 
H




a) There is no outside labor market for provision of home/tenure security. Assuming a 
missing labor market for the provision of home security is reasonably justified by incomplete 
contracts (there some risk involved in employing non-members to guard property - especially 
in those poor communities in Brazil). 
b) Leisure and home production hours are assumed to be perfect substitutes for the 
hours individual spend on property protection. 
c) All households face a common wage wi. 
d) The household is assumed to maximize per capita leisure (li) and not the leisure of 
individual members. 
e) Household talent (Φ) and endowment (E) are assumed to be fixed. 
Assuming, Z = time spent at home = Hh+L 
Hh = work at home and L = leisure 
And  L =  ∑ = 𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1  li,Hh =  ∑ = 𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1  Hh,Hm  = ∑ = 𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1  Hm,X =  ∑ = 𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1  X 
N is the number of household members, li is leisure, xi consumption, Hhi work hours in 
home production, and Hm outside market work hours of household member i, and xi = X/N, li  
= L/N. 8 
 
The value of work at home is given by production function q(Hh) and w is the value of 
work outside or the market wage. 
Household utility is an increasing function of per capita  leisure (li);  per capita 
consumption (xi), and home security tenure (S) (S = home tenure security function) and also 
concave. 
The tenure security function implies that the production of home security is only 
determined by exogenous variable Ω (Ω = exogenous parameter, household formal property 
rights) and the amount of time spent in the home.  
Given the set of talent Φ and endowment E: 
 
U(xi, li, S: Φ, E) where S = S (Z,Ω) 
 
Maximizing the utility function: U(xi,  li,  S:  Φ ,  E ) where S  =  S  (Z,Ω),  where the 
endogenous variables are H
h, H
m, xi, li, and S. 
    Budget (pX) and time (T) constraints to the maximization problem:  
 












m, xi  ≥ 0 
Where  q(.)  satisfies the decreasing marginal productivity (q′  >  0,  q"<  0). Then, 
normalizing prices to one, the household's optimization problem is: 





















  This equation requires the following first-order conditions for an interior solution (H
m 
> 0; H
h > 0; H
m +H
h < T): 
 
𝜔𝜔
𝑁𝑁 × Uxi = 
1
𝑁𝑁 × Uli + Us ∗sH
m   
            
qH
h ×Uxi = 𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖                       
Equation 1 establishes that, at the optimum, households equate the marginal value of an 
additional hour of outside labor with the marginal utility of leisure. Equation 2 states that they 
also equate the marginal utility of leisure with the marginal value of an additional hour of 
work at home.  
Given such context, the demand functions of work hours in the outside market and in 








Assume that 𝑈𝑈𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0,  𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ≤ 0 
In that case, households’ ability to increase security by staying close to home implies 
that optimal allocation of work hours across home and market will depend on the formal 
tenure rights. In particular, maximizing the above utility function subject to the basic budget 
and time constraints mentioned above generates the following inequalities: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  < 0 and 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚





For households involved in both types of labor, an increase in formal tenure security 
decreases work hours at home and increases work hours in the outside market. 
The conditions imply that, in aggregate, strengthening formal property rights decreases 
work hours inside the house and increases time spent outside, reflecting the fact that an 
exogenous increase in formal property protection, lowering the opportunity cost of outside 
labor and making stronger the probability to increase the current income of those households 
as represented by I(Income) = f(w;H
m). 
In the empirical analysis, data limitations prevent the separation of employment hours 
inside and outside the home. Given that, and with respect to the net effect of a property title 
on total labor hours, the model predicts that households with zero home production hours ex-
ante (H
h=0) will increase total household work hours by some positive amount in response to 
a land title and property rights.  
 
3.  Microeconomic Framwork – Labor Supply of Children 
 
An extension of the model, and  a  significant part of the present study approach, 
incorporates differences in the household supply of adult and child labor when only adults 
contribute to home security provision. This extension formalizes the intuitive idea that, if 
adults have comparative  advantage in the provision of home security, in the absence of 
property rights, children will substitute for adults in the labor market. In this case, while total 
household labor hours rise with an increase in formal rights – as demonstrated above, child 
labor hours will actually fall. Here, Na and Nc are the number of adult and child household 
members, respectively, la and lc are per capita adult and child leisure, La and Lc are total adult 
and child leisure and Ta and Tc are total adult and child time endowments. In this setting, the 
household maximization problem is: 
         
maxla,lc,x U (x,la,lc,s (La, Ω)) such that Wa ∗ (Ta-La)+Wc ∗ (Tc-Lc) = X 
     





𝑁𝑁 ) ∗ Ux + (
1




𝑁𝑁 ) + Ux + 
1
𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊 ∗ Ulc = 0 child  
     
From these conditions it can be shown that, for all interior optima, 
∂𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥
∂𝜕𝜕 > 0, and 
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 < 0. 
In households in which children are labor force participants, child labor hours will fall 
and adult labor hours will rise with an increase in tenure security. For all other households, 
adult labor hours will rise and child labor hours will remain at zero. Thus, given a positive 
amount of ex-ante child labor, the aggregate number of child labor hours will unambiguously 
fall, while the number of adult hours rises with an increase in property rights. 
Although this model focuses on optimal labor allocation, the income effect that follows 
from relaxing the household time constraint provides a plausible alternative explanation for a 
decrease in child labor with an increase in formal rights, and one that has been proposed by 
other authors. In particular, a decrease in child labor would follow from the luxury and 
axioms of the Basu & Van (1998) model of labor supply, in which children can substitute for 
adults in the labor market and the family will send children to the labor market only if the 
family's income from non-child labor sources falls below some threshold amount. 
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4.  The Data 
 
The empirical analysis of household labor supply and income responses to changes in 
formal property rights relies on a data survey developed especially and exclusively for this 
paper, in the City of Osasco, an important town in the São Paulo metropolitan area with a 
population of 654,000 people. 
The federal government has chosen Osasco, as one of the participants of the "Papel 
Passado" - a program that intends, as mentioned earlier in the paper, to provide land titles to 
families living under illegal conditions - given its relevant economic and social role. 
The city of Osasco has 30,000 people (about 6,000 families) living under informal 
conditions, which represents almost 4.5% of its total population. The program timetable for 
Osasco establishes that all the communities living in illegal conditions will be part of the 
"Papel Passado" during the period between 2007 and 2014 (the main reason  that  all 
communities are not receiving the land title at the same time is becuase fiscal resources are 
limited). Officially, as released by the Osasco City Hall, the priority follows random criteria. 
Unofficial sources from local communities in Osasco express the feelings that a "political" 
agenda is present in the decision. 
The first community to receive the land title was Jardim Canaã, in 2007, which has 500 
families. The closest neighbor of Jardim Canaã is a community called DR, with 450 families. 
The DR's households will be part of the "Papel Passado" program schedule in 2011. Hence, 
the data of this particular paper consist of 326 households distributed across Jardim Canaã 
and DR (185 from Jardim Canaã and 141 from DR). 
 
4.1  Minimizing Endogeneity Bias Concerns 
 
Given the nature of the research conducted in the city of Osasco, some steps were taken 
to minimize the bias related to the data collected. 
First of all, a technique from Bolfarine & Bussab (2005) was used to choose randomly 
326 sample households. The approach was basically to choose the first 150 households (from 
the Canaã and DR) that have the closest birth dates (day and month) in comparison with the 
three field researchers that conducted the survey interviews (important to mention that the 
field researchers are not from Osasco). Each researcher got 50 names initially as first base. 
Additionally, after reaching each of those households, they could go and pick the third and the 
fifth neighbor on the right hand side. 
Secondly, Heckman & Hotz (1989) states that constructing counterfactuals is the central 
problem in the literature evaluating social programs given the impossibility of observing the 
same person in both states at the same time. The goal of any program evaluation is to compare 
only comparable people. An important step to minimize such issue in this study was to use a 
comparison between those two neighbors (Jardim Canaã  and  DR) with very similar 
characteristics.  Canaã  and  DR  are not only official neighbors but there is no physical 
"borderline" among them, both are geographically united (if someone walks there, it is hard to 
identify the boundaries -- even for the local households). 
One of them, Jardim Canaã, fortunate to receive the titles in 2007, is qualified, for the 
paper proposal, as the main sample. The other, DR, only part of the program schedule in 2011, 
became the control group. This  approach enables a comparison of households in a 
neighborhood reached by the program with households in a neighborhood not yet reached and 
makes it possible to produce a panel of data. 
Another aspect to be mentioned about the data collected is that it produced a unique 
match within the same geographic area, which helped to ensure that comparison units come 
from the same economic environment. Rubin & Thomas (2000) indicate that impact estimates 11 
 
based on full (unmatched) samples are generally more biased, and less robust to miss-
specification of the regression function, than those based on matched samples. 
Given such conditions, the data were produced from a two-stage survey focused on the 
property right issue. However, to minimize bias, the way that survey was prepared and 
conducted by the researchers does not provide any direct information for the households on 
what exactly the research is about. Officially for the people interviewed, the study was about 
general living conditions in the City of Osasco. 
The survey was based on a 39-question questionnaire applied to the 326 families 
randomly sampled as described above. The survey instrument, in many of its questions and 
methodologies, closely mirrors the IBGE Living Standards Measurement Survey (PNAD - 
Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicílios do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística) in content, and therefore contains a variety of information on household and 
individual characteristics. In addition, there are six questions designed to provide information 
on a range of economic, social and personal benefits associated with property formalization. 
(See Appendix A for the complete stage I and stage II questionnaires.) 
The first stage of the survey was conducted in March 2007, before titles had been issued 
to Jardim Canaã, and the second collected in August 2008, almost a year and a half after the 
first titles had been issued (with exactly the same households and with 98.0% recall -- or 2.0% 
missing, which means that almost all the households interviewed in the first survey were 
found and interviewed during the second stage). The reason for the time gap was to give the 
an opportunity to all the households interviewed during the first survey stage to have at least 1 
year with the land title. The exactly dates that each household interviewed received the title 
were provided by the 2nd Cartório de Osasco (2nd Osasco's Office of Registration) along 
with the formal authorization from the Osasco's City Hall to conduct the research. 
Heckman & Hotz (1989) add that is not necessary to sample the same persons in 
different periods -- just persons from the same population. This particular survey instrument 
design has clearly the advantage that the same households were tracked over time to form a 
panel data set. Ravallion et al. (1995) argue that making a panel data with such characteristics 
should be able to satisfactorily address the problem of miss-matching errors from incomplete 
data, a very common issue regarding public policy evaluation. 
Furthermore, it is also important to emphasize again another aspect that helps minimize 
the selection bias. Based on the first survey, 95.0% of the survey participants (from Canaã 
and DR) did not expect to receive any land title, i.e., they were not aware of "Papel Passado" 
and the meaning of it. Such lack of information about the subject provides the study a non-
bias aspect regarding the importance of property rights because it avoids a potential behavior 
deviation from households included in the program. 
Finally, the study also tracks the households that moved outside both communities to 
check if the land title effect stands. From the original sample only 8.0% of the households that 
received the land title have moved away from Canaã (one of the main concerns from local 
authorities in Osasco was that most citizens would receive the land title, sell the property right 
away and return to an informal living conditions and that not has been materialized). From the 
control group, only 1 household (out of 140) has moved during the same period. 
 
5.  Basic Findings – Child Labor Force 
 
This study has used basically four questions to address the issue of child labor using the 
survey. The first question was: “Do you have any children?” (Please refer to Appendix A for 
the complete stage I and stage II questionnaires.) Of the combined sample and control group, 
about 75.0% of the households said they have children (about 73.0% of the sample and 76.0% 
of the control group).   12 
 
After the initial question mentioned above, the survey included the following: a) “Are 
there any children helping in the family’s income? How many? (under 18 years old)”, b) 
“How many hours do they work daily?” and c) “How many days per week do minors work?”                  
On top of that, from those households that have children, 25.5% responded that they have 
minors helping the family’s income (sample 35.4% and control group 64.8%).   
Additionally, the diagram below summarizes the household’s answers (2007 and 2008) 
about weekly hours of child labor. The main issue that arises is related to the fact that for the 
sample, children are working lower hours (and even households that have children working in 
2007 changed path in the survey’s second round) and for the control group the scenario gets 
worst over time.  
 
Figure 4: Child Labor Force Hours Worked Weekly x Number of Households 
 
 
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008 
 
 
6.  Econometric Model: Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
 
6.1  Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Estimator – General Framework  
   
The econometric method used was Difference-in-Difference Estimatation, known as 
DIFF-in-DIFF (DD), given the data characteristics described above. As Bertrand et al. (2004) 
define, Differences-in-Differences consists of identifying a specific intervention or treatment 
(often a passage of a law). One then compares the difference in outcome after and before the 
intervention for groups affected by the intervention to the same for unaffected groups. 
Such approach involves basically two regimes: "0" and "1" given an observed outcome 
Y, which means Y₁=dY₁+(1-d)Y₀. Given d=1, we observe Y₁ and with d=0, Y₀ is observed. 
As Heckman & Hotz (1989) state,  the parameter most commonly invoked in the 
program evaluation literature, although not the one actually estimated in social experiments, is 




In practice, most non-experimental and experimental studies do not estimate E(Δ/X). 










































Given the data characteristics, this particular study aims, as previously mentioned, to 
provide a comparison between "treated" and "untreated" to estimate the impact of treatment 
on the treated with a counterfactual. 
Again as Heckman & Hotz (1989) point  out, it is impossible to form change in 
outcomes between "treated" and "untreated" states for anyone. However, it is possible to form 
one or the other terms for everyone with the counterfactual mechanism. 
Under such scenario, the current study also has the "before-after" estimator which 
incorporates time t in the model. 
Let's assume that the program/treatment occurs only at the time period k and t > k > t′. 
Furthermore,  yit  is the "treated" group at period t, if i=1  and "untreated" if i=0. 
Additionally, consider d=1 is the "treated" group and d=0 the "untreated" group. 
Hence, the main focus is to estimate the following: 
 
E(y1t – y0t|d = 1) = E(y1t – y0t)1 
 
and given that it is possible to decouple the equation above between "treated" and 
"untreated" given two different periods, or t > t′. The Difference-in-Difference estimator is: 
 
E(yit – y0t)1 = E(yit – y0t’)1 – E(y0t – y0t’)1 + E(y0t – y0t’)0 – E(y0t – y0t’)0 
 
And, the assumption is: 
      
E(y0t – y0t’)1 = E(y0t – y0t’)0 
 
This basically means that between periods t and t′, the variation of the "treated" and 
"untreated" averages are the same. Hence: 
 
E(y1t – y0t)1 = E(y1t – y0t’)1 – E(y0t – y0t’)0 
 
Given the fact that there is no treatment at t′, the "treated" differentiates from the 
"untreated" as (y₀t′|d=1)=y¹t′ and (y₀t|d=0)=y⁰t′. Following the equation above: 
 
E(y₁t-y₀t)₁ = E[(y¹t-y¹t′) - (y⁰t-y⁰t′)] = E(Δy₁-y₀) 
 
















6.2  Difference-in-Difference Estimates: The Regression Model 
 
Difference-in-Difference estimates and their standard error, according to Greene (2002), 
most often derive from using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in repeated cross sections (or a 
panel) data on individuals in treatment and control groups (no treatment) for a period before 
and after a specific intervention. As Meyer (1995) argues, the great appeal of DD estimation 
comes from its simplicity as well its potential to circumvent many of the endogeneity 
problems that typically arise when making comparisons between individuals. 




where As and Bt are fixed effects for states and years respectively, Xist are relevant 
individual controls and εist is a error term. The estimated impact of the intervention is the 
OLS estimate β. Standard errors used to form confidence interval for β are usually OLS 
standard errors sometimes corrected to account for correlation of shocks within each year. 
Considering the data characteristics mentioned earlier, this study will assume that the 
estimated coefficient of intervention is variable (given Xist) but does not help to determine 
program participation (land titles were given randomly and households were mostly unaware 
about receiving the title). 
Hence, this specification is a common generalization of the most basic DD, and it will 
be the foundation for this particular study’s econometric technique. The basic assumption is 
that changes in the outcome variable over time would have been exactly the same in both the 
treatment and the control group in the absence of the intervention. 
 
6.3  Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Land Title Specification 
 
In this paper, formally, the dependent variable is hours weekly hours of work of child 
labor force Yist (the outcome of interest for household i in group s by time t). The dependent 
variable would be posted as the difference among weekly hours of child labor in 2008 and 
2007. 
Also, δ indicates whether the household lives in a neighborhood that has been reached 
by the program -- being the dummy for whether the land title has affected the group s at time 
t; with fixed effects and Xi is a vector of characteristic controls. 
Hence, the coefficient δ is the estimated program effect, which provides a measure of 
conditional average difference in time worked by children in households in the program area 
versus the non-program area. 
In addition, Xi includes the following controls: sex (dummy), marital status (dummy, 
example: single) and ethnicity (dummy, example: African Brazilian). 
Another set of variables included, to extend to include fixed effects, and convergent 
with Becker & Lewis’s (1973) suggestion, level of income -- measured in terms of minimum 
wage (please refer to question number P-38 at Appendix A for details). Furthermore, weekly 
hours of adult work is an essential variable to understand child labor according to Rosenzweig 
(1981). 
Patrinos & Psacharapoulos (1994) for Paraguay, Grootaert (1998) for Ghana, and Heady 
(2003) for Pakistan conclude that the more people there are in the family, the higher are the 
chances of having child labor. Given such a framework, the number of household members is 
also included. The same applies for the years of education of the family head. For income, 15 
 
weekly hours, number of household members and years of education, also the difference 
between the survey collection results in 2008 and 2007 is applied (example: the independent 
variable of income is = Income 2008 -  Income 2007 and so on with the other variables 
mentioned). 
As a robustness check, this study also estimates a regression including the households 
that moved from Canaã (households that got the title, sold the property and moved right 
away). The goal is to check if the land title still has a positive effect even considering those 
that are not living in the original community. 
Given all the conditions mentioned above, the basic econometric structure is the 
following: 
 
Yi  = α+δ(Land title)+β(Hours worked weekly-adult)+β(Income)+β(Households 
number)+ β(Years of education)+α′Xi+ei 
 
Furthermore, the main hypothesis to be tested is the following: 
    H₀=δ<0 
    H₁=δ≥0 
 
7.  Results 
 
The summary of basic statistical  results  is  presented in Table 1 (Sample Means). 
Consistent with the study’s basic findings, one main aspect demands special attention. The 
average weekly hours of child labor has decreased in the program households and increased in 
the non-program households. Additionally, for land title owners, weekly hours worked of 
adults increase more. This could provide a potential signal that child labor is being substituted 
by adult work. 
 
Table 1: Sample means - with all households that have children 
  Pre-Program 
(N = 251) 
Post-Program 
(N = 240) 















42.0  45.0  -3.0  42.8  45.9  -3.1 
Time in residency         
(# months) 
 
146.2  158.4  -12.1  157.8  175.0  -17.1 
Household number       
(# members)  3.8  4.0  -0.2  3.9  4.1  -0.2 
 
Number of rooms 
 
3.3  3.7  -0.7  3.3  3.7  -0.4 
Income (number of MW) 
  2.0  3.0  -1.0  2.0  3.0  -1.0 
Years of Education  9.0 
  5.0  4.0  9.0  5.0  4.0 














Child Labor Hours 
Weekly  3.5  9.1  -5.6  0.5  11.9  -11.4 
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    Robustne
ss check 



















































2  0.20  0.20 
RootMSE  7.07  7.34 
N  240  251 
Source: Author's Estimates 
(*) significant at 5% 
(  ) standard deviation 
 
Econometric results appear in Table 2. This study default estimates include the entire set 
of regressors consistent with the current theory regarding child labor and land titles and the 
data collected during the survey. In such specification, the estimate of the  land title δ 
coefficient is -6.82, with a robust standard error of 1.16. 
This outcome is highly consistent with our hypothesis, that property rights (Land Title) 
decrease child labor by 6.82 hours worked per week. With a t-statistic of over 5, the 
coefficient is different from zero at any reasonable level of statistical significance. 
The robustness part of the table provides our robustness check, adding (as mentioned 
previously) to the regression analysis, households that moved. The robustness outcome not 
only remains but also makes it even more significant (-7.26).  This  result  should help to 
reinforce the conclusion that land titling has a positive effect on individuals, and not only on 
property. Households that moved had the same attitude toward child labor. 
Hence, the effect of land titling, given the conditions and variables applied, is clearly 





This paper has presented new evidence on the value of formal property rights in urban 
squatter communities  in a developing country. By studying  the relationship between the 
exogenous acquisition of a land title and child labor force participation, the study has 
provided additional empirical support for the evidence that property titling appears to reduce 
household demand for child labor in the majority of households. 17 
 
Although existing studies indicate significant effects on access to credit, income, home 
investment and fertility (Field 2007; Andrade 2006), this particular study aims at helping to 
fill an important gap in the literature on property rights and child labor force participation. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that,  unlike employment responses to most welfare 
programs, which tend to involve an income effect that potentially removes adult households 
from the labor force, government property titling programs appear to have a different effect -- 
removing child labor from the labor force. 
Regarding further research, it will certainly be interesting to apply the same survey in 
different locations and compare outcome results. Ravallion et al. (2005) argue that the same 
program works well in one village but fails in another. An example is Bangladesh's Food for 
Education Program. The program worked well in reaching the poor in some villages but not 
in others, even in relatively close proximity. Furthermore, it will also add value in keeping 
tracking of the same households with other surveys to check the consistency and robustness of 
the results over time. 
It is clear that understanding the multiple channels through which land titles influence 
economic outcome is particularly  important given that  governments across the world are 
considering titling programs to address urban informality. In addition, the results have 
potential implications for understanding labor market frictions in developing countries 
(Goldsmith, 1995). In places characterized by high levels of residential informality, such as 
most developing and poor countries, informal property protection may constitute an important 
obstacle to labor market adjustment. Hence, land titling  could  be applied as an asset to 
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APPENDIX A: Complete stage I and stage II questionnaires  
 
Stage I 
Good morning/Good afternoon. My name is___________. We are doing a research to develop an academic study about the 




  HOME PHONE                                                  COML                                             MOBILE PHONE  SAMPLE                            
1        2       3 






PF1 – GENDER              1 Male            2  Female              
        
COMPLEXION      1 White-Caucasian      2 African-Brazilian     3 Asian      4  African-Indian      5  Indian  
 
PF2 – How old are you?  
(TAKE NOTE ON THE BOX AND FILL THE AGE GROUP) 
 
      1. 18 to 24       2. 25 to 34        3. 35 to 44      4. 45 to 59       5. 60 – more   
 
P1. Currently, do you work? (IF YES)  
1  YES → CONTINUE                                                                   2  NO → GO TO P.8 
 
P2. What is your main activity? (THROUGH OF THE OCCUPATION, IDENTIFY THE BETTER SITUATION). 
                   PEA (Active Economic Population) 
1  Wage Employee - Registered 
2  Wage Employee - Unregistered 
3  Public Servant 
4  Regular Self-Professional (Pays Social Security ex: 
maid) 
5  Self Professional (with college degree ex: lawyer) 
6  Entrepreneur 
7  Free-lancer 
8  Internship (with salary) 
9  Others (TAKE NOTE)_____________________ 
 
P3. What’s your main activity? 
 
   
P4. Where do you work?   (READ UNTIL THE QUESTION MARK) (STIMULATED AND UNIQUE) 
 
                    1  at Home                   2  Own Neighborhood                   3 Another neighborhood         4 Another town 
P5. How many hours do you work each day?  
  TAKE NOTE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS 
 
P6.  How many days per week? (STIMULATED AND ONLY) (THE HIGHEST AVERAGE FREQUENCY) 
  1 day         2 days        3 days       4 days    5 days    6 days    7 days (everyday) 
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P7. Do you just study / Are you a retired / Are you a housewife / Are you unemployed? (IF UNEMPLOYED) Are you looking for 
a job or not? 
 
NO PEA (Non-Active Economic Population)                            
 NO PEA  
 
11 Only housewife                                              12 Only retired 
13 Only student                                                   14 Other forms of income 
15 Other (TAKE NOTE)                                   16 Unemployed (Don’t seeking for a job) – NO PEA 
17 Unemployed (Seeking for a job) – PEA 
 
P8. Do you have any children? (STIMULATED AND ONLY) 
                                         1  Yes    2  No 
P9. How many people, including yourself, live in your place? (TAKE NOTE) 
  TAKE 
NOTE 
 
P10. Are there any children/teenager helping in the familiar income? How many? (= UNDER 18 years old) 
  TAKE 
NOTE 
99 There are no children working  GO TO P.13 
                           
P11. How many hours they work daily ?  IF THERE ARE MORE THAN ONE WORKING, PLEASE CHECK THE AVERAGE OF 
WORKED HOURS BETWEEN THEY ALL (PER DAY) - DON’T PROVIDE THE SUM 
  TAKE NOTE - QUANTITY OF WORKED HOURS 
 
P12. How many days per week do minors work? (SPONTANEOUS AND UNIQUE) (THE HIGHEST AVERAGE FREQUENCY) 
 
1 day         2 days        3 days       4 days    5 days    6 days    7 days  (everyday) 
 
 
P13. Do you have some other source of income? .... (READ UNTIL THE QUESTION MARK) 
1)   Alimony             2) Pension                               3) Retirement                           4) Unemployment Insurance    
5)  Any rent                            6) Donations                           7) Occasional jobs                   8) Social programs                      OR 
98  Other? Which?________________________               99 – NO ONE 
 
 
P14. Are you (or someone in your home) benefited by any Government social program? 
    1) Yes                         2) No  → go to P18 
 
P15.  Which social program benefits you (or someone in your home)? READ THE ALTERNATIVES 
 
1  Bolsa família                 2  Bolsa escola           3  Student pass                        4  Unemployment pass 
5  LOAS/BPC                    6  Basket good          7  Housing Program                8  Medicines     
9  Donations                      10  PRONAF               11 PROGER                          98 Other. Which?__________________ 
 
P16. What’s your marital status? (SPONTANEOUS AND UNIQUE) 
                       1. Single                        2. Married                         3. Widowed                        4. Divorced              
 
 
P17. About the house where you live, you think you are… (READ UNTIL THE QUESTION MARK)  
(STIMULATED AND ONLY) 
1. Housewife / Head of family / mother / wife (ONLY FOR WOMEN) 
2. Head of family / husband / father  (ONLY FOR MEN) 
3. Son / Daughter (older than 18 years old)  OR 
4. Other adults (18 or older)   
 
 
P18. "Taken all together, how would you say things are these days - would you say that you are … READ UNTIL THE 
QUESTION MARK: 
 
  1 Not too happy                   2  Pretty Happy         OR             3  Very happy ? 
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P19.On the whole, about the life that you lead, are you...  READ UNTIL THE QUESTION MARK: 
  1 Not at all satisfied                          2 Fairly Satisfied              OR          3  Very satisfied?  
 
 
LET’S TALK ABOUT YOUR HOME  
 
P20. How long do you and your family live here?  (TAKE NOTE) 
Year  Months 
 
P21. Which the size of your property? 
 
1 Until 20m
2                   2 More than 20 m
2 - 40m
2                3  More than 40m
2 - 60m
2                    4 More than 60m
2                5 
Don’t know 
 
P22. How many rooms have your place? (TAKE NOTE) 
 
1 One       2 Two      3 Three     4 Four     5 Five     6  Six     7  Seven     8  Eight     9  Nine     10 Ten     98  Other TAKE NOTE 
________ 
 
P23. Do you use your place only as home? 
 
1 Yes  →  GO TO PP.26             2 No  →  CONTINUE 
 
P24. What kind of trade/service there is in your home?     P25. How long are you doing that in your home? 
1. Bar    1. Less than 1 year 
2. Mini-market    2. 1 to 3 years 
3. Beauty and Cosmetics     3. More than 3 to 5 years 
4. Homemade food and candies    4. More than 5 to 10 years 
5. Mechanics and Auto-service    5. More than 10 to 15years 
6. Deposit of recycle material    6. More than 15 years 
7. Church    7. Don’t know 
8. Other. Which one ?................................................       
 
P26. How did you acquire this residence? ( SHOW THE CARD AND READ IT) 
 
1. Bought the property from the Householders Association 
2. Bought the property from other household and built the house 
3. Bought an already built house  
4. Occupied the property and built the house 
5. The property was conceded definitely by the former owner 
6. The property was inherited by a relative that passed away 
7. Rent the house   
8. The property was temporarily borrowed  by the current owner 
9.  Was  officially  transferred by  the local government/ Has received the land title from the local 
officials 
9. Other. Which one  TAKE NOTE  
96. Don’t know / Don’t remember   
 
P276. (TO P26 = 1,2,3) Could you tell me how much did you pay for this property?  (TAKE NOTE) 
R$ 
 
P26b. (TOP27# 7 and 8 Have you ever have rented this property to another household?  (TAKE NOTE) 




P26c. Do you know what is the market value of this property today?  (TAKE NOTE) 
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P27.  Could you tell me if during the last year have you purchased something by credit?  (SPONTANEOUS AND ONLY) 
                  1  Yes                    2 No  (GO TO P30) 
 
P28. What was the payment method chosen to make this purchase? (READ THE ALTERNATIVES) (STIMULATED AND 
MULTIPLE) 
1) Credit card                                   2) Debit card                                      3) Postdated check               4) Payroll credit 
5) Installment payment slip             6) Store collection statement             7) Financing                          8) Other (TAKE NOTE)  
 
 
P29. Last year did you take any personal loan? (SPONTANEOUS AND ONLY) 
1  Yes      1  Bank/financing company/insurance       2  Family/Friends     3  Credit card     4 Other ____________        96 No  
 
 
P30. Have you delayed any payment of personal loan or purchase on credit? (TO P.28=1 or P30 =1) 
               1)  Yes                     2) No (GO TO P 33)  
 
 
P31.  (TO P.27=1 or P29 =1)  (For those who delayed  payments last year)  How past due was/is the delay? (READ THE 
ALTERNATIVES) (STIMULATED AND MULTIPLE) 
1) Less than 30 days        2)  Between 31 to 60 days      3)  Between 61 to 90 days    4) More than 90 days    5) More than 180 days    
 
 
P32. Thinking about the payment methods which you use regularly, I would like to know which of them you use more frequently:   
READ EACH ITEM_________ 
 
 
P33. FOR EACH PAYMENT METHOD THAT YOU REGULARLY USE, I would like to know the level/degree that you 
use between 1 and 5, 1 is the lowest and 5 the highest (STIMULATED) 
    Lowest use        Highest use 
A) Check  1  Yes   2 No   1  2  3  4  5 
B) Postdated check  1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
C) Debit card  1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
D) Credit card  1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
E) Store card  1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
F) Installment payment 
slip 
1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
G) Cash   1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
I) Others ? (TAKE 
NOTE) 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 
P34 Now, I will ask some questions about your home. Such information is required only for socioeconomic classification.  




THERE IS      (QUANTITY) 
1  2  3   
Color TV  0  1  2  3   
Videocassette/ DVD   0  2  2  2   
Radios   0  1  2  3   
Baths  0  4  5  6   
Vehicles   0  4  7  9   
Maid  0  3  4  4   
Washing machines  0  2  2  2   
Refrigerator  0  4  4  4   
Freezer (*)  0  2  2  2   
(*) independent or 2 doors on refrigerator 25 
 
P35. Which level of education have the head of the family reached?  
English  Points 
Fill 
          Portuguese 
Illiterate/ Elementary school incomplete   0  Analfabeto/ até 3ª Série 
Fundamental 
Elementary school completed/ middle school 
incomplete  
1  4ª Série Fundamental 
Middle school completed/ High school incomplete  2  Fundamental completo 
High school completed/ College incomplete  4  Médio completo 
College complete  8  Superior completo 
 
P36  (SHOW THE “INCOME CARD”)  
 
Now, I will read some income groups and I would like you tell me what group is your monthly familiar income included. I mean, 
the sum of income of all people living in your home, including you. Your monthly familiar income (last month) was? (READ THE 
INCOME GROUPS) (STIMULATED AND ONLY)  
 
(SM = Minimum wage) 
1  Until R$ 380,00  Until 1 SM 
2  R$ 381,00 to R$ 760,00  More than 1 to  2 
SM 
3  R$ 761,00 to R$ 1140,00  More than 2 to 3 
SM 
4  R$ 1141,00 to R$ 1.520,00  More than 3 to 4 
SM 
5  R$ 1.521,00 to R$ 2.660,00  More than 4 to 7 
SM 
6  R$ 2.660,00 to R$ 4.560,00  More than 7 to 12 
SM 
7  R$ 4.560,00 to R$ 8.740,00  More than 12 to 
23SM 
8  More than R$ 8.741,00  More than 23 SM 
 
P37) Do you expect to receive any land title from the local officials or the Household Association during the next year? 
    1  Yes    2  No 
 







Good morning/Good afternoon. My name is___________. We are doing a research to develop an academic study about the 
local living conditions. I would like to count on your cooperation to understand what is your level of satisfaction regarding such 
matter. 
NAME 
HOME PHONE                                            COML                                            MOBILE PHONE  SAMPLE                           
1        2       3 
FAMILY’S HEAD NAME  LIST CODE 
ADDRESS   
 
PF1 – GENDER              1 Male            2  Female             
  
COMPLEXION      1 White-Caucasian      2 African-Brazilian     3 Asian      4  African-Indian      5  Indian  
 
PF2 – How old are you?  
(TAKE NOTE ON THE BOX AND FILL THE AGE GROUP) 
 
      1. 18 to 24       2. 25 to 34        3. 35 to 44      4. 45 to 59       5. 60 – more   
 
 
P1. Currently, do you work? (IF YES)  
1  YES → CONTINUE                                                                   2  NO → GO TO P.8 
 
P2. What is your main activity? (THROUGH OF THE OCCUPATION, IDENTIFY THE BETTER SITUATION). 
                   PEA (Active Economic Population) 
1  Wage Employee - Registered 
2  Wage Employee - Unregistered 
3  Public Servant 
4  Regular Self-Professional (Pays Social Security ex: 
maid) 
5  Self Professional (with college degree ex: lawyer) 
6  Entrepreneur 
7  Free-lancer 
8  Internship (with salary) 
9  Others (TAKE NOTE)_____________________ 
 
P3. What’s your main activity? 
 
   
P4. Where do you work?   (READ UNTIL THE QUESTION MARK) (STIMULATED AND UNIQUE) 
 
                    1  At home                   2  Own Neighborhood                   3 Another neighborhood         4 Another town 
 
 
P5. How many hours do you work each day?  
  TAKE NOTE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS 
 
 
P6.  How many days per week? (STIMULATED AND ONLY) (THE HIGHEST AVERAGE FREQUENCY) 
  1 day         2 days        3 days       4 days    5 days    6 days    7 days (everyday) 
 
 
P7. These hours are greater, equal to or lower compared to one year ago?  (STIMULATED AND ONLY)  
  1   Greater           2  Equal to          3  Lower  
P8. Do you just study / Are you a retired / Are you a housewife / Are you unemployed? (IF UNEMPLOYED) Are you looking for 
a job or not?  
NO PEA (Non-Active Economic Population)                            
 NO PEA  27 
 
 
11 Only housewife                                                               12 Only retired 
13 Only student                                                                    14 Other forms of income 
15 Other (TAKE NOTE)                                                    16 Unemployed (Don’t seeking for a job) – NO PEA 
17 Unemployed (Seeking for a job) – PEA 
 
P9. Do you have any children? (STIMULATED AND ONLY) 
                                         1  Yes    2  No 
 
 
P10. How many people, including yourself, live in your place? (TAKE NOTE) 
 
  TAKE 
NOTE 
 
P11. Are there any children/teenager helping in the familiar income? How many? (= UNDER 18 years old) 
  TAKE 
NOTE 
99 There are no children working  GO TO P.15 
                           
 
P12. How many hours they work daily ?  IF THERE ARE MORE THAN ONE WORKING, PLEASE CHECK THE AVERAGE OF 
WORKED HOURS BETWEEN THEY ALL (PER DAY) - DON’T PROVIDE THE SUM 
 
  TAKE NOTE - QUANTITY OF WORKED HOURS 
 
P13. How many days per week do minors work? (SPONTANEOUS AND UNIQUE) (THE HIGHEST AVERAGE FREQUENCY) 
1 day         2 days        3 days       4 days    5 days    6 days    7 days  (everyday) 
 
 
P14. The number of hours is greater, equal to or less than one year ago? (STIMULATED AND ONLY)  
1   Greater           2  Equal to          3  Lower  
 
P15. Do you have some other source of income? .... (READ UNTIL THE QUESTION MARK) 
1)   Alimony 2) Pension                     3) Retirement               4) Unemployment Insurance              5)  Any rent 
6)   Donations            7) Occasional jobs        8) Social programs      98)  Other? Which?___________________        99 – NO ONE 
 
 
P16. Are you (or someone in your home) benefited by any Government social program? 
    1) Yes                         2) No  → go to P18 
 
 
P17.  Which social program benefits you (or someone in your home)? READ THE ALTERNATIVES 
1  Bolsa família                 2  Bolsa escola           3  Student pass                        4  Unemployment pass 
5  LOAS/BPC                    6  Basket good          7  Housing Program                8  Medicines     
9  Donations                      10  PRONAF               11 PROGER                          98 Other. Which?__________________ 
 
 
P18. What’s your marital status? (SPONTANEOUS AND ONLY) 
                       1. Single                        2. Married                         3. Widowed                        4. Divorced         
 
P19. About the house where you live, you think you are… (READ UNTIL THE QUESTION MARK)  
(STIMULATED AND ONLY) 
5. Housewife / Head of family / mother / wife (ONLY FOR WOMEN) 
6. Head of family / husband / father  (ONLY FOR MEN) 
7. Son / Daughter (older than 18 years old)  OR 
8. Other adults (18 or older)   
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P20. "Taken all together, how would you say things are these days - would you say that you are … READ UNTIL THE 
QUESTION MARK: 
   
1 Not too happy                   2  Pretty Happy         OR             3  Very happy ? 
 
LET’S TALK ABOUT YOUR HOME  
P21. How long do you and your family live here?  (TAKE NOTE) 
Year  Months 
 
P22. Which the size of your property? 
1 Until 20m
2                  2 More than 20 m
2 - 40m
2             3 More than 40m
2 - 60m
2                  4 More than 60m




P23. How many rooms have your place? (TAKE NOTE) 




P24. Do you use your place only as home? 
1 Yes  →  GO TO PP.27               2 No  →  CONTINUE 
 
P25. What kind of trade/service there is in your home?     P26. How long are you doing that in your home? 
1. Bar    1. Less than 1 year 
2. Mini-market    2. 1 to 3 years 
3. Beauty and Cosmetics     3. More than 3 to 5 years 
4. Homemade food and candies    4. More than 5 to 10 years 
5. Mechanics and Auto-service    5. More than 10 to 15years 
6. Deposit of recycle material    6. More than 15 years 
7. Church    7. Don’t know 
8. Other. Which one ?................................................       
 
P27. How did you acquire this residence? (SHOW THE CARD AND READ IT) 
 
1. Bought the property from the Householders Association 
2. Bought the property from other household and built the house 
3. Bought an already built house  
4. Occupied the property and built the house 
5. The property was conceded definitely by the former owner 
6. The property was inherited by a relative that passed away 
7. Rent the house   
8. The property was temporarily borrowed  by the current owner 
9.  Was  officially  transferred by  the local government/ Has received the land title from the local 
officials 
9. Other. Which one  TAKE NOTE  
96. Don’t know / Don’t  remember 
 
 
P27a. (TO P27 = 1,2,3) Could you tell me how much did you pay for this property?  (TAKE NOTE) 
R$ 
 
P27b. (TOP27# DE 7 and 8 Have you ever have rented this property to another household?  (TAKE NOTE) 
   1   Yes   How much? R$_______________________________________         
2  No       
 
R$ 




P28.  Could you tell me if during the last year have you purchased something by credit?  (SPONTANEOUS AND ONLY) 
                  1  Yes                    2 No  (GO TO P30) 
 
 
P29. What was the payment method chosen to make this purchase? (READ THE ALTERNATIVES) (STIMULATED AND 
MULTIPLE) 
1) Credit card                         2) Debit card                              3) Postdated check                      4) Payroll credit 
5) Installment payment slip             6) Store collection statement             7) Financing               8) Other (TAKE NOTE)  
 
 
P30. Last year did you take any personal loan? (SPONTANEOUS AND ONLY) 
1  Yes      1  Bank/financing company/insurance       2  Family/Friends     3  Credit card     4 Other ____________             96 No  
 
P31. Have you delayed any payment of personal loan or purchase on credit? (TO P.28=1 or P30 =1) 
               1)  Yes                     2) No (GO TO P 33)  
 
 
P32.  (TO P.28=1 or P30 =1)  (For those who delayed  payments last year)  How past due was/is the delay? (READ THE 
ALTERNATIVES) (STIMULATED AND MULTIPLE) 
 
1) Less than 30 days        2)  Between 31 to 60 days      3)  Between 61 to 90 days    4) More than 90 days    5) More than 180 days     
 
 
P33. Thinking about the payment methods which you use regularly, I would like to know which of them you use more frequently:   
READ EACH ITEM_________ 
 
 
P34. FOR EACH PAYMENT METHOD THAT YOU REGULARLY USE, I would like to know the level/degree that you 
use between 1 and 5, 1 is the lowest and 5 the highest (STIMULATED) 
    Lowest use        Highest use 
A) Check  1  Yes   2 No   1  2  3  4  5 
B) Postdated check  1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
C) Debit card  1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
D) Credit card  1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
E) Store card  1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
F) Installment payment 
slip 
1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
G) Cash   1  Yes   2 No  1  2  3  4  5 
I) Others ? (TAKE 
NOTE) 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
P35.On the whole, about the life that you lead, are you...  READ UNTIL THE QUESTION MARK: 




P36 Now, I will ask some questions about your home. Such information is required only for socioeconomic classification.  
 




THERE IS      (QUANTITY) 
1  2  3   
Color TV  0  1  2  3   
Videocassette/ DVD   0  2  2  2   
Radios   0  1  2  3   
Baths  0  4  5  6   
Vehicles   0  4  7  9   
Maid  0  3  4  4   
Washing machines  0  2  2  2   
Refrigerator  0  4  4  4   
Freezer (*)  0  2  2  2   
 (*) independent or 2 doors on refrigerator 
 
P37. Which level of education have the head of the family reached?  
English  Points  
Fill 
          Portuguese 
Illiterate/ Elementary school incomplete  0  Analfabeto/ até 3ª Série 
Fundamental 
Elementary school completed/ Middle 
school incomplete 
1  4ª Série Fundamental 
 Middle school completed/ High school 
incomplete 
2  Fundamental completo 
High school completed/ College incomplete  4  Médio completo 
College complete  8  Superior completo 
 
P38  (SHOW THE “INCOME CARD”)  
 
Now, I will read some income groups and I would like you tell me what group is your monthly familiar income included. I mean, 
the sum of income of all people living in your home, including you. Your monthly familiar income (last month) was? (READ THE 
INCOME GROUPS) (STIMULATED AND ONLY)  
 
(SM = Minimum wage) 
1  Until R$ 380,00  Until 1 SM 
2  R$ 381,00 to R$ 760,00  More than 1 to  2 
SM 
3  R$ 761,00 to R$ 1140,00  More than 2 to 3 
SM 
4  R$ 1141,00 to R$ 1.520,00  More than 3 to 4 
SM 
5  R$ 1.521,00 to R$ 2.660,00  More than 4 to 7 
SM 
6  R$ 2.660,00 to R$ 4.560,00  More than 7 to 12 
SM 
7  R$ 4.560,00 to R$ 8.740,00  More than 12 to 
23SM 
8  More than R$ 8.741,00   More than 23 SM  
 
 
ONLY IF P27 = 9 - TO FINISH, you told me you got, last year, the land title from the local officials. I would like you tell me 
how such event has changed your life. In a scale of 1 to 10, considering 1 as no effect at all, and 10 if your life is really better because of the 
land title  
1      2     3     4     5      6    7    8     9    10       96 Don’t know 
 
 
Thank you for the cooperation. 
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APPENDIX B 
   
Table 3: Sample means with all households 
  Pre-Program 
(N = 326) 
Post-Program 
(N = 310) 















39.0  42.4  -3.4  40.0  43.4  -3.4 
Time in residency         
(# months) 
 
143.4  154.4  -11.0  155.8  170.2  -14.4 
Household number       
(# members)  3.8  4.0  -0.2  3.9  4.0  -0.2 
 
Number of rooms 
 
3.3  3.6  -0.3  3.3  3.6  -0.3 
Income (number of MW) 
  2.0  3.0  -1.0  2.2  3.0  -0.8 
Years of Education  9.0 
  5.0  4.0  9.0  5.0  4.0 














Source: Author’s Estimates 